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C o m m e n t a r y
Lawfare Today:
A Perspective
By Major General Charles  J .  Dunlap,  Jr. ,  USAF
Lawfare is a concept that is ever more frequently discussed in government, 
academic, and media circles.  Regrettably, that discussion is not as informed 
as it might be.  The purpose of this commentary is to clarify what lawfare 
means by discussing how it originated, how it is being used by opposing 
sides in modern conflicts, and what some of the challenges are as we look 
ahead.  Although I’ve tinkered with the definition over the years, I now 
define “lawfare” as the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute 
for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.1  As such, 
I view law in this context much the same as a weapon.  It is a means that can 
be used for good or bad purposes.  
I started using “lawfare” in speeches and writings2 beginning in the late 1990s 
because I wanted a “bumper sticker” term easily understood by a variety 
of audiences to describe how law was altering warfare.  At that point, I had 
the hubris to think I invented the term; actually, it had been used a couple of 
times previously in a completely different context starting in the mid-1970s.3 
I needed something to describe what I and others saw as a new relationship 
between law and war.  General James L. Jones, then the commander of NATO, 
famously observed in a Parade magazine article:
It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle…In a perfect world, a general 
would get up and say, “Follow me, men,” and everybody would say, 
“Aye, sir” and run off.  But that’s not the world anymore, …[now] you 
have to have a lawyer or a dozen.  It’s become very legalistic and very 
complex.4
The reasons for this phenomenon are several, but I think they are largely 
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traceable to the growing importance of international law generally, a growth 
itself tied, in my judgment, to globalization.  Today’s international commerce 
requires an extensive legal architecture to function, and this fact operates to 
raise the “legal consciousness”, so to speak, of the entire world community.5 
As we have seen before,6 such trends in global affairs tend to spill over into 
warfare.
Lawfare can operate as a positive “good.”  Ideally, substituting lawfare 
methodologies for traditional military means can reduce the destructive-
ness of war, if not its frequency.  An illustration: prior to starting our mili-
tary operations in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, military planners were 
concerned about the ready availability of high-resolution, near real-time 
commercial satellite imagery of the operational area – information of very 
obvious military value to our adversaries.  One can imagine any number of 
orthodox military approaches that might have been used to stop such data 
from reaching enemy hands.  Instead, a legal “weapon”, that is, a contract, 
was launched to achieve the same effect.  Specifically, exclusive rights to all 
the imagery were purchased, thus denying it to potential opponents.7  In 
this respect lawfare is an excellent example of what military strategists call 
effects-based8 operations where the effect created is the focus, not necessarily 
the means of obtaining it.
Law-oriented, effects-based operations have become a critical piece of our 
counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.  Specifically, General David Petraeus, 
the U.S. commander in Iraq,9 established a Rule of Law Complex in Bagh-
dad, an innovation the New York Times called an “important element of the 
American campaign plan.”10  The Complex is a fortified “Green Zone” for 
legal infrastructure designed, the Washington Times reports, to “bring police, 
judicial/jail functions to a secure environment.”11 This self-contained haven 
permits Iraqis to solve Iraqi problems in relative safety for themselves and 
their families.  Supporting this effort is the Law and Order Task Force, staffed 
by judge advocates (JAGs) from all the services.  After completing a tour 
of reserve duty with the Task Force last summer, Colonel Lindsey Graham 
– who is, incidentally, a U.S. senator – observes that building a fair legal 
system that holds all segments of the population accountable is “[o]ne way 
to kill the insurgency beyond [using] military force.”12  
Other aspects of lawfare are more complicated.  As Yale Law School Professor 
Michael Riesman and Yale Law School alumnus Chris T. Antoniou explained 
in their 1994 book, The Laws of War:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires 
a substantial base of public support.  That support can erode or even 
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reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if 
people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, 
or iniquitous way.13
Of course, belligerents have long sought to use the perception or fact of 
wrongdoing by their opponents as a means of catalyzing support among their 
own people, and eroding it among their foes.  Modern information technolo-
gies have, however, vastly increased the scope, velocity, and effectiveness of 
such efforts.  For example, recriminations about civilian casualties – often 
illustrated by horrific images – instantly fill the broadcasts of the 24-hour 
global news services, and rapidly appear on thousands of websites and in 
the blogosphere.  Adversaries waging this form of lawfare see our adherence 
to law as something to exploit.  Professor William Eckhart, well-known for 
having prosecuted the My Lai cases during his JAG service, observes that:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands 
compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as 
illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the 
law of war.  Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von 
Clausewitz would term our ‘center of gravity.’14
It is a mistake, however, to reduce “lawfare” to a mere component of a glo-
rified propaganda campaign.  In truth, it is a richer and far more complex 
concept – and one, lamentably, subject to misunderstanding.
Among other things, concern from the public, NGOs, academics, legisla-
tures, and the courts about the behavior of militaries is more than simply a 
public relations problem; it is a legitimate and serious activity that is totally 
consistent with adherence to the rule of law, democratic values, and – for 
that matter - lawfare.  Accordingly, I disagree with Mr. Scott Horton when he 
charged in the July 2007 issue of Harper’s Magazine that “lawfare theorists” 
– and I guess I’m one of them - reason that lawyers who present war-related 
claims in court “might as well be terrorists themselves.”15 That is absurd. 
He apparently wants to endow lawfare with a kind of intrinsic evilness that 
it simply does not and cannot possess.  As I say, lawfare is much like a tool 
or weapon that can be used properly in accordance with the higher virtues 
of the rule of law – or not.  It all depends on who is wielding it, how they 
do it, and why.
To be clear, I condemn any interpretation of lawfare which would cast ter-
rorists as those legitimately using the courts to challenge any governmental 
action.  As a matter of fact, the use of the courts is something I advocate as a 
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vitally important lawfare measure.  Why?  Courts can help suppress criminal 
behavior which, especially in today’s environment, operates to create effects 
indistinguishable from conventional battlefield defeats.  It is no surprise 
that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then the senior American commander in 
Iraq, used customary military terminology in saying that Abu Ghraib was 
“clearly a defeat.”16  Thus, wholly apart from abstract notions of justice, there 
are pragmatic, purely military reasons for using the courts.  Commanders are 
keenly aware that if behavior like that at Abu Ghraib is allowed to flourish, 
the military task becomes vastly more difficult, and requires significantly 
more reliance upon costly military force.  
Obviously, judicial action can help deter such damaging misconduct from 
occurring in the future.  However, the legitimacy of the process requires the 
zealous efforts of all, including defense counsel.  Recourse to the courts is 
a facet of lawfare to be encouraged, not discouraged.  Of course, there are 
nefarious uses of lawfare.  These would include those who would manipu-
late respect for the law to achieve a military advantage.  An illustration is 
the frequency with which insurgents use mosques as armories, assembly 
points for fighters, and command and control centers.  They are trying to 
take advantage of the protections normally accorded religious sites under the 
law of armed conflict.17  Even more despicable, our adversaries commonly 
hide among noncombatants in order to shield themselves from attack or, if 
attacked, propagandize any civilian losses that may occur.  Unfortunately, 
this can drive the militaries of democracies to take well-meaning but ill-con-
sidered steps that ultimately play into enemy hands.
Consider how reports about NATO airstrikes allegedly causing civilian ca-
sualties were handled by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan.  As I wrote in a Washington Times op-ed last August,18 ISAF 
responded to queries about a report of such deaths by proclaiming that 
“NATO would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians nearby.”19 
Sadly, such rules encourage the enemies to do exactly what we do not want 
them to do.  That is, they surround themselves with innocents so as to im-
munize themselves almost entirely from attack.  
As these examples show, lawfare – in both positive and negative forms - is 
now a fact of modern war.  A recent web search of the term produced over 
51,000 “hits” – a stupendous increase from the handful in 2001.  The rise of 
lawfare has stimulated something of a “revolution in military legal affairs”20 
that has made JAGs an indispensable part of a commander’s warfighting 
team.  Because JAGs are members of the brotherhood of arms, commanders 
are naturally comfortable with them.  Moreover, the military training JAGs 
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receive helps them understand the weapons, strategies, and command and 
control processes of modern war.  
Knowing the military client’s “business,” so to speak, is essential for lawfare 
practitioners.  Candidly, I find that many of our civilian colleagues, especially 
in academia, just do not know enough about today’s high-tech military to be 
as expert as they might want to be.  More than specialized technical expertise 
shapes the JAGs approach to legal issues.  A fascinating essay by Professor 
Richard Schragger of the University of the Virginia Law School contrasts JAG 
conceptions from those of other government attorneys. He notes that:
Military lawyers seem to conceive of the rule of law differently [than 
civilian government lawyers].  Instead of seeing law as a barrier to the 
exercise of the client’s power, these attorneys understand the law as a 
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of power…Law makes just wars 
possible by creating a well-defined legal space within which individual 
soldiers can act without resorting to their own personal moral codes.21
Not everyone, however, appreciates the new role of uniformed lawyers in 
contemporary lawfare-intense conflicts.  I’d like to take a few minutes to dis-
cuss this criticism because I believe it is a crucial issue not just in the context 
of lawfare, but for national security law in general.
Consider the article that Professor John Yoo co-authored in the August issue 
of the UCLA Law Review.  Yoo, I am sure you recall, was involved in some of 
the most troubling national security law legal opinions in recent years.  Jack 
Goldsmith’s recent book discusses several of them. 22  In his article Professor 
Yoo attacks military lawyers as being much responsible for what he considers 
a “breakdown” in civil-military relations.23  Professor Yoo’s motivation for 
lashing out at JAGs is not difficult to discern: as Charlie Savage’s new book 
reports, 24 JAGs opposed, with some success, several of the legal propositions 
Yoo touted when he worked in government.  
Professor Yoo contends that the JAG legal opinions amounted to no more 
than simply “policy preferences” that should have yielded to his concept of 
the “unified decisionmaking” of the executive branch.  I beg to differ.  JAG 
opposition to harsh physical interrogation techniques was a reflection of an 
analysis of the fundamental principles of human decency that underpin law 
in this country, not to mention around the globe.  Likewise, opposition to 
an evidentiary scheme for military commissions that would have allowed 
an accused to be convicted and sentenced to death based upon evidence he 
never saw is not a mere “policy preference” as Yoo would have it, but rather 
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insistence upon the most basic elements of due process common to every 
system of jurisprudence in the free world.  
These are legal interpretations, and it is wrong to trivialize them into mere 
“preferences.”
In any event, Professor Yoo’s solution to the “breakdown” - as he calls it - in 
civil-military relations involves creating a “principal-agent” model in which, 
as I understand it, the legal advice of JAGs would have to conform with that 
of the executive branch’s politically-appointed lawyers.  This would create 
a number of problems, including ethical ones.  Our Air Force Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, which are largely identical to the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, state that military lawyers “shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice.”25
Professor Yoo also sees the courts as a disruptive influence on civil-military 
relations.  Here’s the way he put it:
JAG attorneys representing enemy combatants...challenged the 
legality of their clients’ detention in federal court.  Military officers 
with different policy preferences 
sought to introduce the judiciary as 
another actor to disrupt the unified 
decisionmaking of the principal.26
Amazingly, Professor Yoo is even un-
happy with JAGs counseling command-
ers about warfighting legal issues.  He 
disapproves of the idea that “American 
combat officers must now seek out JAGs 
for rulings on the incorporation of the 
law of armed conflict into their ongo-
ing operations.”27  In fact, he rebukes 
civilian leaders for allowing “a regime to arise in which the JAGs advise, 
within the confines of the law, the best means of achieving military objec-
tives.”28  In my opinion, such advising is exactly what JAGs ought to do in 
the lawfare era.
What does Professor Yoo want to do about the JAGs he sees as “disruptive”? 
Punish them.  Indeed, he castigates the “reluctance of civilian leaders to 
sanction military officers” who have, to his way of thinking, “undermined 
[civilian leaders’] decisions.”29  As to the structure Professor Yoo advocates, 
yoo contends that the 
jag opinions amounted 
to no more than "policy 
preferences" that should 
have yielded to his concept 
of "unified decisionmaking." 
i beg to differ.
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in my opinion it is at odds with that our Constitution provides.  That docu-
ment wisely assigns civilian-control-of-the-military responsibilities not just 
to the executive but to all three branches of government.  
What is more is that our very strong Constitutional tradition seeks to keep 
the armed forces nonpartisan.  Indeed, in Greer v. Spock,30 the Supreme Court 
unequivocally insisted that the military be “insulated from both the reality 
and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes.” 
In the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act31 Congress acted to ensure 
that commanders and senior civilian leaders would have access to indepen-
dent, nonpartisan legal advice from military lawyers.  That landmark piece 
of legislation designated the Judge Advocate Generals as “the”32 legal advi-
sors of their respective military departments, and their authority to render 
“independent legal advice” was enshrined in law.33
Perhaps most importantly, the law now forbids anyone in the Department of 
Defense not only from interfering with the rendering of independent legal 
advice, but also from taking any action infringing upon the “ability” to do 
so.34  It is important to emphasize that relations between military lawyers 
and the vast majority of our civilian counterparts are typically warm and 
professional.  Still, as you may imagine, there remain a few who, like Profes-
sor Yoo, seem to fume about the role Congress has given JAGs, and seek to 
diminish it – and not all of them are academics outside of government.  Yet 
the imperatives of today’s lawfare environment require much of JAGs.  Ac-
cordingly, we continue – when necessary – to do our best to “speak truth to 
power,”35 even when doing so is disquieting to those who may hear it.
Political appointees certainly have a right to put in place ideologically-driven 
policies so long as doing so comports with the law.  And I agree that the 
proper public role of serving officers in debates about policy is currently the 
subject of much-needed discussion.36 That said, should we not strive to make 
determining the “law” in a given situation a politically-neutral task?  In my 
mind there is a real distinction between debating policy and determining the 
law.  Healthy civil-military relations are vital to a democracy.37  JAGs work 
hard to do their duty yet not overstep the proper bounds - a rather tricky 
proposition in a place like Washington where everything seems to have a 
partisan dimension these days.  The support – and vigilance – of the American 
public is needed to ensure the appropriate balance is maintained.
Allow me to close with another plea.  Today more than ever our nation needs 
the synergistic efforts of the entire government, both military and civilian, 
to succeed in today’s complex lawfare milieu.  Let us work together – ag-
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gressively – to maximize mutual respect in the dialogue.  This is a critical 
challenge for the entire national security law community. Y
-William Ko served as lead editor for this article.
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